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Abstract
We analyze the impact of liability risks for malpractice on the
optimal reimbursement schemes for hospitals. In our model, the hos-
pital decides upon two unobservable eﬀorts, a cost reduction eﬀort
and a quality improvement eﬀort. We assume that the total eﬀort is
positive even without monetary incentives due to some intrinsic mo-
tivation, but that motivation is biased towards quality. In our basic
model without liability risks, we then ﬁnd that either a fee-for-service
system (FFS) or a ﬁxed-fee prospective payment system (PPS) is op-
timal, but mixed systems are strictly inferior. With liability risks,
mixed systems are in general optimal, and the variable part of costs
that should be borne by the hospital is increasing in the degree of the
liability risk. This may at least partially explain why countries like
Germany where liability risks are low compared to the US have been
more reluctant in switching from FFS to PPS.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and main results
In many countries as in the United States and in Germany, the reimburse-
ment systems for hospitals went through tremendous changes in the last
two decades. Until the 1980s, the predominant scheme was a fee-for-service
(FFS) system which, roughly speaking, means that all ”reasonable” costs
were covered by the health insurance based on the hospital’s cost report.1
As emphasized in the literature,2 this traditional cost reimbursement system
had two advantages - there was a strong incentive to provide high quality,
and there was no incentive to discriminate among patients. However, it has
also long been realized that the FFS sets no incentive to keep the cost down
since they are covered anyway. In fact, incentives may be perverse when fees
per day are calculated on a full cost basis, because the hospital then has
an incentive to increase the length of a patient’s stay in hospital since the
payment is above marginal costs.3
In 1984, the United States were the ﬁrst country to substitute FFS by a ﬁxed-
fee prospective payment system (PPS) based on diagnosis related groups
(DRG) in the Medicare system.4 Under a PPS system, the health insurer
pays a ﬁxed price per patient, where this lump sum varies from DRG to
DRG in order to account for the major diagnoses, additional complications,
gender or age. In the following years, PPS started being widely used, and
was adopted in the 1990s in Australia as well as in several other countries.
In Germany, hospitals are reimbursed on the basis of DRG since 2003.
Whereas it is uncontroversial that PPS is a high-powered incentive scheme
leading to lower costs, both the political discussion and the literature has
focussed on two problems that may be caused by PPS. First, PPS sets in-
centives to select low cost-patients whenever DRG do not perfectly take into
1For details on country-speciﬁc reimbursement schemes see Ellis/McGuire (1986 and
1988) or Chalkley/Malcomson (1998) for the US system and Simon (2000) for the German
system.
2See e.g. the overview in Newhouse 1996.
3For an overview on empiric results see Ellis/McGuire (1988 and 1996) and
Meltzer/Chung (2002).
4The Medicare System was established to ﬁnance medical care for the elderly in the
United States and is the largest single purchaser of health care in the US.
2account every single characteristic of the patient. Since each patient may in
fact be diﬀerent, a perfect discrimination would require as many DRG’s as
patients, so that cream-skimming and dumping incentives can never be fully
eliminated. Second, even within one perfectly homogenous DRG, the hospi-
tal has incentives to reduce quality when the amount of cost reimbursement
is given. Hence, the literature has often concluded that combined systems
may be superior (see the literature review below).
In our paper, we ignore the selection problem by restricting our attention to
homogenous patients, and focus instead on the impact of diﬀerent reimburse-
ment schemes on the quality- and the cost cutting-incentive. As for this, we
develop a simple multi-task principal-agent model where the hospital (the
agent) divides its unobservable eﬀort between the two tasks of quality im-
provement and cost cutting. Whereas costs are observable and veriﬁable, we
assume that the quality is uncontractable, so that the health insurer (the
principal) can only set direct incentives for cost-cutting, but not for quality
improvement. In our basic model, we ﬁnd that either FFS or PPS, but no
combined system, can be optimal. This result is based on three assumptions
that are often emphasized as being important for a doctor’s eﬀort choice:
First, even without monetary incentives, the total eﬀort is positive since
doctors are intrinsically motivated. Second, if there are only incentives for
cost-cutting (this will be the case with PPS), the quality eﬀort will neverthe-
less be positive due to the so called Hippocratic Oath that requires doctors
to deliver not only the very basic quality of care. And third, if there are no
monetary incentives at all (this is the case with FFS), doctors have a bias
towards quality.
Besides intrinsic motivation, there are various quality incentives in reality
even within a prospective payment system. Patients may get stochastic qual-
ity signals that inﬂuence their future demand (reputation eﬀects), high qual-
ity hospitals may attract better doctors, and the liability risk for malpractice
decreases in the quality eﬀort. In our extended model, we focus on the im-
pact of liability, since the liability risk diﬀers widely between countries (see
our discussion in section 5) which allows to compare our theoretical ﬁndings
to reality. We show that, if the liability regime is neither too weak nor too
tough in a sense to be speciﬁed in the model, then a combined system is
superior. However, FFS can be optimal if liability is of minor importance,
and PPS can be optimal if liability plays an important role. Although the
result is straightforward from a theoretical point of view (the higher is the
liability risk, the higher is the quality incentive, and the less are the negative
3eﬀects when moving from FFS towards PPS), we believe that it is important
to take the diﬀerent liability regimes into account when thinking about the
consequences of the reimbursement schemes adopted in diﬀerent countries.
1.2 Relation to the literature
Following the general idea of yardstick competition (Shleifer 1985), the early
literature5 has argued that PPS can lead to eﬃcient incentives even if the
eﬀort costs of cost reduction are private information. If each hospital is
reimbursed for the average marginal costs of all other hospitals, the payment
is independent of the own behavior, and incentives will thus be eﬃcient.
In departing from his basic idea, however, the preceding literature has iden-
tiﬁed at least four drawbacks of PPS. First, if there is unobserved hetero-
geneity among patients, then some hospitals will make negative proﬁts when
a simple yardstick reimbursement scheme is applied. If negative proﬁts need
to be avoided, hospitals with a favorable portfolio will earn positive rents,
thereby causing shadow costs of public funds.6 Second, incentives for cream-
skimming will arise whenever the classiﬁcation in diﬀerent DRG’s underes-
timates the costs of treating morbid patients (see e.g. Allen and Gertler
(1991)). A third and related drawback of PPS is dumping and has been
analyzed in various papers by Ma.7 Fourth, PPS may lead to underprovision
of treatment intensity if the quality is unobservable (see e.g. Ellis (1997)
or Chalkley and Malcomson (1998)). If demand depends upon quality, this
eﬀect is mitigated, and may even disappear if the relationship becomes close
enough (see Allen and Gertler (1991) and Rogerson (1994)).
With respect to our paper, an important point is under which circumstances
corner solutions (i.e. either FFS or PPS) or mixed systems are optimal. Since
FFS gives no incentive for cost-cutting while PPS may lead to underprovision
if quality is (partially) unobservable, the literature has often concluded that
mixed reimbursement schemes are optimal (see e.g. Ellis and McGuire (1986)
and Rogerson (1994)). Conversely, in the multi-task framework considered
in Ma (1994), one can always ﬁnd a ﬁxed fee per patient within a PPS that
5See Newhouse (1996) for an overview.
6This is closely related to the more general literature comparing cost-plus regulation
to price caps (or low-powered to high-powered incentive schemes).
7See Ma (1994), Ma (1997), and Ma (1998).
4leads to ﬁrst best incentives for both cost reduction and quality. The reason
is as follows: ﬁrst, the hospital’s incentive for cost reduction is identical
to the social planner’s one since the variable costs are fully borne by the
hospital. Second, the incentive for quality improvement comes from the
assumption that demand depends on quality. And the higher the ﬁxed fee
per patient, the higher the incentive to increase quality in order to attract
more patients.8 Note that the reason why corner solutions are optimal in our
basic model are quite diﬀerent as we consider only the eﬀort incentive for
a given set of patients. In reality, the impact of quality on demand clearly
varies from ﬁeld to ﬁeld9, so that the two approaches may be considered as
being complementary.10
To the best of our knowledge, Gal-Or (1999) was the ﬁrst to analyze the
impact of liability on the optimal reimbursement scheme. She focuses on the
division of liability between an insurer (or a Managed Care Organization)
and the hospital. If the insurer can perfectly control the intensity (quality
in our paper) of the treatment, then PPS combined with full liability for the
hospital leads to a ﬁrst best. Otherwise, a mixed system arises, and both
quality provision and cost reduction are too low. Although related to our
ﬁndings, our model diﬀers in focusing on the hospital’s preference towards
quality and on the fact that the cross partial derivative with respect to the
two eﬀorts is positive, thereby leading to a ”real” multi-task principal-agent
problem which Gal-Or does not take into account. At a more theoretical level,
our paper borrows from the literature on multi-task principal-agent problems
pioneered by Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991). Finally, the concept of a vague
negligence rule adopted in section 4 has been developed by Schwartz (1998)
in the context of accountant’s liability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 derives the insurance company’s optimal contract under
the assumption that there are no liability payments for malpractice. Section
4 captures liability risks by the concept of a vague negligence rule. Section
8Ma (1994) also considers cream skimming, but this is less important when comparing
to our paper.
9For instance, for cosmetic surgeries, the impact may be high, whereas it is almost
neglectable for emergency service.
10The lower the impact of quality on demand, the higher the ﬁxed fee per person required
to induce eﬃcient eﬀort quality incentives in a framework like Ma’s one. Then, the shadow
costs of public funds become extremely high, thereby limiting the practical scope of the
suggestion.
55 compares our ﬁndings to reality and concludes.
2 The model
We consider a hospital treating one representative patient. The patient per-
fectly ﬁts into a speciﬁc diagnosis related group (DRG), so that we do not
account for selection problems. The hospital exerts total unobservable eﬀort
e, where a fraction q is spend on quality improvement, and a fraction c on
cost cutting. Hence, q+c = e. The hospital’s eﬀort cost function is given by
E(e), where E(e) = 0 8e · e,
dE(e=e)
de = 0, dE
de > 0 and d2E
de2 > 0 8e > e. The
underlying idea is that variable eﬀort costs are zero up to some eﬀort level e
because the medical staﬀ is intrinsically motivated, and hence performs eﬀort
e voluntarily, i.e. without monetary incentives. Up to e, there are only ﬁxed
(opportunity) costs that we can safely normalize to zero. Our assumptions
on E(e) ensure that @2E
@q@c > 0 8e > e, so that eﬀort costs of providing quality
are increasing in the eﬀort spend on cost cutting (and vice versa).





dq2 < 0. Treatment costs C depend on c where dC
dc < 0 and d2C
dc2 > 0.
Note the diﬀerence between E and C: E are the hospital’s managerial eﬀort
costs, while C are monetary treatment costs that may be covered by a health
insurance company. We assume that C is observable and veriﬁable, while the
reimbursement scheme can not be made contingent on E and Q.11 Assuming
that all participants are are risk neutral, social welfare can simply be written
as
SW = Q(q) ¡ C(c) ¡ E(e). (1)
We denote ﬁrst best levels by superscript ”f” and assume that qf;cf > e to
guarantee that the eﬀort chosen without incentives is always too low from a
social point of view. Together with our assumptions on Q(q), C(c) and E(e)


















Without monetary incentives, the hospital chooses e and faces only ﬁxed
eﬀort costs normalized to zero. Then, we assume that the hospital divides
e on q and c according to ° =
q
e, i.e. ° is the percentage of costless eﬀort
exerted for quality if there are no monetary incentives. Deﬁning °f as the
socially optimal division of e, we assume that ° > °f. This expresses that
the hospital has a bias towards quality.12
Finally, we assume that there is a lower bound for quality given by e q < q
even if the insurer sets monetary incentives to spend all eﬀort on cost cutting.
This minimum quality eﬀort may arise for diﬀerent reasons, for instance
due to the Hippocratic Oath, according to more generally motivated moral
considerations, or coming from liability risks. In section 3, we will simply
assume that e q is exogenously given.
We restrict our attention to linear payment schemes where the health insurer
covers a fraction ® of treatment costs C and pays a ﬁxed amount ¯. The
traditional fee-for-service system (FFS) can then be interpreted as ® = 1,
since the insurer covers costs C regardless of their amount. By contrast,
® = 0 captures PPS because the hospital receives only a ﬁxed fee ¯. The
lower ®, the ”higher powered” is the reimbursement scheme with respect
to the cost-cutting incentive. Ignoring agency problems between the health
insurer and the insure,13 the hospital’s utility function is
U = ¡(1 ¡ ®)C(c) ¡ E(e) + ¯, (4)
while the health insurer’s expected proﬁt is
Π = Q(q) ¡ ®C ¡ ¯. (5)
Finally, the hospital’s reservation utility is normalized to 0, and the hospital
is protected by limited liability in the sense that up-front payments from the
12Note that the quality will nevertheless be below the optimal one since q = °e · e < qf.
13This implies that the insurer perfectly cares about quality. As common in the litera-
ture, the treatment quality being part of the insurer’s proﬁt can be justiﬁed due to two
reasons. First, the relationship between the insurer and the insuree is often longterm, so
that the insurer beneﬁts from cured patients. Second, in most European countries health
insurers are regulated or even held by the government (e.g. the NHS in Britain).
7hospital to the insurer are excluded (¯ ¸ 0). Our assumptions are clearly
quite simple, but they will allow to shed some light on the following two
questions: ﬁrst, why do we often observe either FFS or PPS, but not a
mixed system that is usually derived as being optimal in the literature? And
second, how does the ranking between the two systems depend on the quality
distortion incentive °, on the minimum quality e q chosen in any case and on
the eﬀort cost function?
3 The insurer’s optimal contract choice
We now turn to the insurance company’s optimal contract deﬁned as Γ¤ =
(®¤;¯¤)14. Let us start with
Lemma 1. (i) In the proﬁt maximizing contract Γ¤, the hospital gets no rent.
(ii) Γ¤ maximizes social welfare.
All Proofs are in the Appendix.
The reason for Lemma 1 is that the hospital’s utility would always be negative
without up-front payment as long as ® · 1, since total eﬀort costs E and
a part (1 ¡ ®) of treatment costs C are then borne by the hospital. Hence,
the hospital’s limited liability has no impact on the optimal contract since
¯¤ > 0 anyway, and the preferences of the health insurer and the regulator
are aligned.
This given two cases, ® = 1 and ® < 1 need to be distinguished to describe
the hospital’s behavior. The reason why we diﬀerentiate between these two
cases is that for all ® < 1, e q is chosen.
Case 1. FFS (® = 1). Here, we have U = ¡E(e) + ¯, and the hospital
chooses q and c. This leads to
SW®=1 = Π®=1 = Q(q) ¡ C(c). (6)
Two ineﬃciencies arise for ® = 1: total eﬀort is below the ﬁrst best one, and
the eﬀort division is distorted towards quality.
14In the following equilibrium values wear an asterisk.
8Case 2. Mixed system or PPS (® < 1). For ® < 1, the hospital’s
expected utility function is
U = ¡(1 ¡ ®)C(c) ¡ E(e) + ¯. (7)
Since there are monetary incentives to reduce treatment costs while there are
no incentives to enhance treatment quality Q (@U
@q = ¡
@E(e q;c)
@q < 0 8e > e),
the hospital chooses the minimum quality eﬀort e q while the equilibrium cost








Since ¡(1 ¡ ®) dC
dc > 0 8c and
@E(e=e)
@c = 0, there is an interior solution where
c¤+e q > e 8® < 1. In other words, as long as there is no full FFS, the hospital
will always choose eﬀort above e.
The health insurer maximizes
SW®<1 = Q(e q) ¡ C(c
¤) ¡ E(c
¤ + e q) (9)
since ¯ will be adjusted accordingly so that U(Γ¤) = 0.15 Since q¤ = e q









Comparing Eqn. (10) to the hospital’s ﬁrst order condition given by Eqn.
(8) shows that both are identical for ®¤ = 0, i.e. when the hospital is
not compensated for the treatment costs at all. Then, there are again two
ineﬃciencies compared to the ﬁrst best: First, the quality is too low since
only e q is chosen. Second, the cost-cutting eﬀort is too high compared to
the ﬁrst best level (c¤
®=0 > cf) since the eﬀort cost function is convex, and
because q¤ < qf. Since this (marginal) cost eﬀect does not only hold for
the hospital’s objective function but also for the (second best) social welfare
function, the insurer has no reason to reduce this eﬀect by choosing ® > 0;
thus SW®<1 = SW®=0.
15¯¤
®<1 is implicitly given by U¤ = ¡(1 ¡ ®)C(c¤) ¡ E(c¤ + e q) + ¯¤ = 0.
9Comparison. Our results demonstrate that, in the basic model, either FFS
or PPS but no interior solution can be optimal. Whenever the insurer does
not fully cover the treatment costs (® < 1), the hospital will only choose e q
since there is no beneﬁt from choosing higher quality eﬀort. But then, ® = 0
is chosen as to fully internalize the treatment costs. The only method to
implement a higher quality is to cover all costs (FFS), which leads to q > e q.
To compare the two corner solutions, deﬁne ∆SW ´ SW®=0 ¡ SW®=1:
∆SW = Q(e q) ¡ C(c
¤
®=0) ¡ E(e q;c
¤
®=0) ¡ (Q(q) ¡ C(c)). (11)
Taking into account that e q < q < qf and that ° > °f, we can summarize in
Proposition 1. (i) Either FFS (® = 1) or PPS (® = 0) is second best-
optimal. (ii) FFS leads to ineﬃciently low total eﬀort, and the division of
eﬀort is distorted towards quality. (iii) PPS leads to even lower quality eﬀort,
and to ineﬃciently high cost reducing eﬀort. (iv) That PPS is superior is
the more likely (a) the higher e q, (b) the higher °, and (c) the less steep the
E(e)-function.
All results are fairly intuitive. With PPS (® = 0), only the minimum quality
eﬀort e q is chosen, and the higher this eﬀort, the better. However, this leads
to an excessive cost reducing eﬀort above the ﬁrst best level. By contrast,
covering all costs (FFS, ® = 1) leads to a distortion towards quality expressed
by ° > °f, and to ineﬃciently low overall eﬀort. The lower °, the lower
the ﬁrst ineﬃciency. Finally, the steeper the eﬀort cost function, the less
important it is to implement a high overall eﬀort by choosing ® = 0.
4 Liability for malpractice
The main result of section 3 was that only corner solutions as often observed
in reality (FFS or PPS) can be optimal if the quality eﬀort e q is the same
whenever the cost reduction incentive is positive at all (® < 1). In other
words, corner solutions are optimal if the minimum quality eﬀort level is
exogenously given, for instance according to the Code of Ethics.
In this section, we investigate what happens if e q is an endogenous variable
following from the hospital’s optimization. This does not mean that we
neglect the hospital’s intrinsic motivation for quality, but rather expresses
the natural view that the hospital nevertheless reacts to shifts in opportunity
10costs. Then, the quality eﬀort q will depend on the incentive to spend eﬀort
on cost reduction c (and thus on ®) because, the higher c, the higher are the
costs of q due to the convexity of the cost function E(e). As for this, we now
assume that the hospital’s risk of being held liable for malpractice decreases
in q.
We model the liability risk in a simple way. In all countries, liability for mal-
practice is negligence based, but the negligence standard adopted by the court
is obviously imperfect in the sense that it cannot be perfectly anticipated ex
ante. Thus, the concept of a vague negligence rule initially developed in the
literature on liability for accounting ﬁrms16 seems to be appropriate. Let us
deﬁne L(q) as the expected liability payments as a function of q. To make
our points as easy as possible, we assume that L(q) = Lmax ¡ ¿ ¢ Q(q), so
that there is a simple linear relationship between the expected quality and
the variable part of the expected liability payment. ¿ < (>)1 means that
the impact of the quality eﬀort q on the expected liability payment is lower
(higher) than the impact on the expected quality itself, so that we speak of a
weak (a tough) vague negligence rule if ¿ < 1(¿ > 1).17 Clearly, ¿ < 1 seems
to be more realistic.
Under these circumstances, the hospital’s expected utility function becomes
U = ¡(1 ¡ ®)C(c) ¡ L
max + ¿Q(q) ¡ E(e) + ¯. (12)
Since ¯ will again be adjusted such that U = 0, the hospital accepts the
equilibrium contract and gets no rent. Let us ﬁrst consider FFS, i.e. ® = 1.
Then, U = ¡Lmax + ¿Q(q) ¡ E(e) + ¯, and instead of choosing q and c as








where our assumption that e < qf ensures that c¤ = 0. Hence, for ® = 1,
introducing vague negligence leads to a further decline of the cost reducing
eﬀort since c¤ = 0 is chosen instead of c. This leads to
16See Schwartz (1998).
17The advantage of this simple speciﬁcation is that dL
dq = ¡¿
dQ
dq which simpliﬁes the





dq which is more tedious for the comparative statics without
leading to additional insights. Of course, our speciﬁcation could also be interpreted as a
partial strict liability rule since, for ¿ = 1, we simply have ordinary strict liability.
11Lemma 2. Suppose FFS applies (® = 1). (i) If the liability rule is weakly
tough (¿ ¸ 1), then q¤ > qf. (ii) If the liability rule is weak (¿ < 1), then
q¤ Q qf.
The intuition for Lemma 2 is straightforward. For ¿ = 1, the quality risk
is fully internalized. However, as c¤ = 0, and since marginal costs for q are
increasing in c¤, the quality eﬀort will be above the ﬁrst best level. This
incentive to deliver too high quality is aggravated if ¿ > 1. For ¿ < 1,
however, there are countervailing eﬀects leading to q¤ Q qf. On the one
hand, there is an incentive to underinvest in quality as the liability risk is
below the quality risk. On the other hand, q is ceteris paribus higher than
qf as c¤ = 0 < cf.
Let us know consider the case of ® < 1 to check if an interior solution may
















Note that for ¿ = 1 and ® = 0, we have c¤ = cf and q¤ = qf since both the
quality risk and the cost eﬀect are perfectly internalized. However, the vague




d® > 0, (ii) dc¤
d® < 0.
Lemma 3 simply expresses that the incentives for quality (for cost-cutting)
are increasing (decreasing) if the insurer covers a higher percentage of the
costs. This leads to
Proposition 2. (i) d®¤
d¿ · 0. (ii) If the vague negligence rule is weak (¿ < 1),
then 0 < ®¤ · 1. (iii) If the vague negligence rule is weakly tough (¿ ¸ 1)
then ®¤ < 1.
The higher ¿, the higher the quality incentive, and this is balanced by choos-
ing a low ® (see Lemma 2). This explains part (i) of the Proposition. Part
(ii) says that, in the realistic case where the liability rule does not internal-
ize the total expected quality risk, the insurer covers a fraction ® > 0 of the
12treatment costs. Hence, PPS cannot be optimal for ¿ < 1. The reason is
as follows: For ® = 0 and ¿ < 1, we know that, if c¤ = cf were chosen, we
would have q¤ < qf. But the lower q, the higher c due to the convex eﬀort
cost function E(e). Hence, for ® = 0, the hospital would choose too high
a cost reduction eﬀort (c¤ > cf) and too low a quality eﬀort (q¤ < qf). To
mitigate this eﬀect, the insurer sets ® > 0 which reduces c¤ and increases q¤
via the marginal cost eﬀect. Note the diﬀerence to the former section where
PPS could be optimal, since we did not adopt the (opportunity)cost principle
when deriving e q. But whenever this is taken into account and ¿ < 1, the
insurer should cover part of the hospital’s cost.
To see why ® = 1 can be optimal for ¿ < 1, note that ® = 1 leads to the
maximum reachable quality eﬀort which is again due to the fact that c = 0
for ® = 1 combined with the convexity of the cost function. If the liability
rule is ”very weak” (¿ ! 0), then ® = 1 may be optimal as we are actually
back in the no-liability situation of section 3.18 However, the health insurer
cannot implement a ﬁrst best by adjusting ® appropriately, since for ¿ < 1
and ® > 0, the eﬀort division could be optimally adjusted, but the overall
eﬀort will deﬁnitely be too low as only part of the quality risk and part of
costs are internalized.
For a tough vague negligence rule (¿ > 1), we get a similar result (part (iii) of
the Proposition). If the insurer covered all costs, then we would have q¤ > qf
due to ¿ > 1. Furthermore, we would have c¤ = 0, and these ineﬃciencies
can be mitigated by choosing ® < 1. Hence, FFS can never be optimal if the
liability rule is tough, and PPS can only be optimal if the marginal impact
of the quality eﬀort on the liability risk is higher than on quality itself.
Summing up, by contrast to the case without liability, interior solutions for
the cost reimbursement share ®¤ arise if the liability rule is neither ”very”
weak nor ”very” tough. The tougher the liability rule, the smaller the part
of the treatment costs the insurer should cover.
5 Discussion
In a simple model about the optimal cost sharing between a health insurer
and a hospital, we have found the following: With full cost reimbursement
18To avoid misunderstandings, let us emphasize that the deﬁnition of a ”weak” rule is
not that the overall liability risk is small (Lmax may be high), but that the impact of
quality eﬀort q on the liability exposure is small.
13(FFS), both the cost-reducing eﬀort and the quality eﬀort are too low, but
quality is relatively high (although below the ﬁrst best one) due to the doc-
tors’ preferences. With PPS, costs are reduced, but the quality is even lower
than with FFS. Mixed systems are strictly inferior to PPS, because the hos-
pital will only provide the minimum quality as soon as there is cost sharing,
and because the incentive for cost-cutting is reduced. Hence, our model oﬀers
a potential rationale for the fact that many countries have radically switched
from FFS to PPS.
In our extended model with liability risks, one of our results is that FFS can
be superior with low liability risks and PPS with high liability risks. Hence,
one should expect that countries with high liability risks (thereby providing
high quality incentives) have a higher incentive to switch from FFS to PPS.
This seems to be the case when comparing the reimbursement schemes in
Germany and the US, where PPS plays an increasingly important role since
the mid 1980s, whereas PPS was implemented in Germany only very recently.
Although liability is negligence based in both countries, there are at least two
factors leading to the result that the liability risk for malpractice is in fact
much higher in the US.
First, although the burden of proof is allocated to the patient in both coun-
tries, the evidence required to trigger liability is considerably higher in Ger-
many.19 In Germany, the so called ”prima facie”-rule requires that the mis-
treatment was deﬁnitely apt to have caused the damage in some way. In
the USA, the ”res-ipsa-loquitur” rule means that the potential injurer is ex-
onerated if he proves that a diﬀerent result is at least as likely as the one
presented by the plaintiﬀ. From an economic point of view, the diﬀerent
rules can be interpreted in the sense that the probability threshold that the
damage has been caused by malpractice is higher in Germany.
The second diﬀerence relates to the amounts awarded to plaintiﬀs. In the
USA, the average amount was approximately $271.000 in 2001,20 whereas the
scale of damages resulting from successful tort litigation in Germany seems
to be much lower. Although there is no oﬃcial source that collects and
analyzes malpractice data in Germany, one of the major insurers for German
doctors’ liability risks, the DBV-Winterthur, estimated the average liability
payment to be about $25.000 in 1999. Furthermore, even though the civil
legislation in Germany does not assign a limit for the amount of damage
19See e.g. Faure/Koziol (2001) and Kennedy/Grubb (2000).
20See National Practitioner Data Bank Annual Report 2001.
14to be paid, the maximum non-pecuniary payments for pain and suﬀering
are hardly ever higher than $250.000).21 Conversely, as a reaction to the so
called mega awards up to $100.000.000 that have lead to physicians leaving
the market, damage caps of $250.000 or $350.000 have been introduced in
some US-states.
Summing up, these factors indicate that the liability system for malpractice
and its use in the USA indeed provide strong incentives for quality eﬀort, so
that switching from FFS to PPS is likely to be more eﬃcient compared to
systems as the one in Germany. For mixed systems that we have found to
be optimal if the liability risk is neither too very strong nor very weak, our
model suggests that the cost sharing parameter should be higher in countries
like Germany compared to countries like the USA, and that the liability risk
should be taken into account when designing the reimbursement scheme.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Part (i). First, ®¤ · 1 since ® > 1 would lead to c < c,
thereby reducing Π at no beneﬁt. Second,
U = ¡(1 ¡ ®)C(c) ¡ E(e) + ¯ < ¯ 8® < 1 (16)
which requires ¯ > 0 to fulﬁll the hospital’s participation constraint U ¸
0. And since ¯ has no incentive eﬀect at all, the insurer sets ¯ such that
U(Γ¤) = 0. Part (ii). Since Π(Γ¤) = Π(Γ¤)+U(Γ¤) = SW(Γ¤), the insurance
company maximizes social welfare. ¥





de q > 0 since @C
@c¤ = @E¤





d° < 0 as
d(Q(q)¡C(c))
d° > 0 and ° > °f
by deﬁnition of °f, and by the concavity of Q(q) and C(c).(c) Deﬁne a
set of functions e E(e) = ÁiE(ei) with Ái > 1. Consider any two functions
e E(e1) = Á1E(e1) and e E(e2) = Á2E(e2) where Á1 < Á2 and E(e1) = E(e2)
8e1 = e2 . Deﬁne e¤
2 as the optimal e2, and SW ¤
2(e¤










@ei , we have
e¤
1 > e¤
2. Assume that, for Á1, e1 = e¤
2 is chosen instead of e¤
1, which is clearly






































since Á1 < Á2. By deﬁnition of optimality, SW ¤
1(e¤




2), and hence SW ¤
1(e¤
1) > SW ¤
2(e¤
2). ¥



















@q2 < 0 due to the fact that Eqn. (13) ex-
presses a maximum, we have
dq¤
















@q@c > 0, it follows
dq¤
dc < 0. Since q¤(ef;¿ = 1) = qf, part (i) of
the Lemma follows. For part (ii), we have q¤ < (>)qf if the c-eﬀect (the
¿-eﬀect) dominates. ¥
Proof of Lemma 3.














































































































16Assuming an interior solution, the determinate of the denominator is positive,







dc < 0 and
@2E(c;q)
@q@c > 0: Thus
dq¤




















< 0 for Eqn. (18) expressing a maximum.
¥
Proof of Proposition 2.
We proceed in two steps:
(1) We show that
dq¤
d¿ > 0 and dc¤




d® < 0 8¿. Note that steps (1) and (2) together are suﬃcient to prove
part (i) of the Proposition: the higher ¿, the higher is q¤ and the lower is
c¤, and since
dq¤
d® > 0 and dc¤
d® < 0, it follows that high q¤ and low c¤ are
countervailed by choosing low ®. To prove part (ii) of the Proposition, one
needs additionally take into account that q¤ = qf and that c¤ = cf if ® = 0
and ¿ = 1. Thus, it follows from steps (1) and (2) that q¤ < qf and c¤ > cf
for ® = 0 if ¿ < 1. By deﬁnition of optimality, social welfare is then always
higher if ® > 0 as this leads to lower c¤ and to higher q¤. Part (iii) follows
analogously by considering the case ¿ ¸ 1. ¥














































































































Assuming an interior solution, the determinate of the denominator are pos-
itive, and we restrict our attention to the determinants of the numerators.













dq > 0 and
h









@q = 0 indicating a maximum. Hence
dq¤








dq > 0 and
@2E(q;c)
@c@q > 0: Thus, dc¤
d¿ < 0.
Step (2). see the Proof of Lemma 3.¥
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